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Dynamic Militant Insurgency in Conflicted Border 
Spaces: Ferghana, the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border, 
and Kashmir
Simbal Khan
Most analysts agree that during the last fourteen years the presence of 
Western military forces has acted as a counterweight to the threat of militant 
and terrorist organizations to the security of South-Central Asian states.1
These militant organizations are still viewed largely from the perspectives of 
globalization and terror. Both regional states and international stakeholders 
still routinely identify these organizations as a primary threat to regional 
stability. This chapter argues that the issue of transborder militant 
organizations is much more complex in character. A broad look at the most 
notable transborder militant organizations operating within South-Central 
Asia reveals that almost all of them, in one way or another, have cleaved to 
long-enduring geopolitical faultlines in the region. The faultlines that 
specifically interest us in this chapter run along the three most problematic 
borders which geo-spatially frame much of South-Central Asia: the state 
borders in the Ferghana Valley, the disputed Pakistan-Afghanistan boundary, 
and the Pakistan-India border in Kashmir. Notably, some of the better known 
and better organized transborder militant movements are associated with 
these three border spaces. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the 
Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, and Kashmiri militants are all intertwined 
with the complex histories of these border spaces.  
At the same time as the global war against terror is becoming 
increasingly diversified and sophisticated in its technology, most accounts of 
transborder terrorism fail to ask the simple, yet crucial, question about how 
                                                          
1 “Dangerous to Withdraw All Troops from Afghanistan: Experts,” First Post, July 11, 2013,
http://www. firstpost.com/world/dangerous-to-withdraw-all-us-troops-from-
afghanistan-experts-947785.html; also see Seth G. Jones, “After the Withdrawal: A Way 
Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” RAND Corporation Testimony, March 19, 2013, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT300/CT382/
RAND_CT382.pdf; also see Jeffrey Mankoff, “The United States and Central Asia After 
2014,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2013, 12,
http://csis.org/files/publication/130122_Mankoff_USCentralAsia_Web.pdf. 
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regional states continue to relate to their conflicted border spaces. Also 
absent from analysis is how old geopolitical faultlines within the region have 
shaped the structures and created space for these transborder forces. Before 
9/11/2001, South-Central Asia was seen as a hotbed for the proxy wars of the 
Cold War era. Some of these proxy struggles involved international actors, 
such as the U.S.-supported mujahedin war against the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan in the 1980s.2 Accounts also exist of U.S. and Pakistani 
intelligence collaboration in supporting the infiltration of transborder militant 
actors in Soviet Central Asia, notably in Tajikistan.3 In other instances, 
regional states have used non-state actors as proxies to revise post-
independence borders, including both Pakistan and India. Pakistan has used 
non-state actors in Kashmir starting as early as 1948 to support the 
independence of Kashmir.4 India in 1971 successfully supported Bengali 
insurgents and helped in the secession of the eastern wing of Pakistan into an 
independent Bangladesh. Even now, the presence of armed non-state actors 
capable of attacking targets across borders, or what is being called the “sub-
conventional threat,”5 is extremely worrying when we consider that the 
nuclear security regime in the region, which has two nuclear-armed states 
(India and Pakistan), is extremely volatile and vulnerable.6
Since 9/11, however, old complexities of inter-state relations in the 
region and the conflicted geopolitics of borders have become subsumed by 
the dominant narratives of the Global War on Terror and concepts of “jihad” 
                                                          
2 Vincent Burns and Kate Dempsey Peterson, Terrorism: A Documentary and Reference 
Guide (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2005), 5.
3 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 104–5.  
4 Christine Fair, “The Militant Challenge in Pakistan,” Asia Policy 11 (January 2011): 107; 
and see S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, “The Jihad Paradox: Pakistan and Islamic 
Militancy in South Asia,” International Security 37, no. 1 (Summer 2012): 114.
5 “The sub-conventional threat” is a term coined by George Perkovich referring to the 
presence of non-state actors carrying out attacks on behalf of, or against, nuclear-armed 
states. This threat is particularly dangerous because non-state actors such as terrorist 
organizations do not adhere to the “unitary rational actor model” that forms the basis of 
nuclear deterrence. See George Perkovich, “The Non-Unitary Model and Deterrence 
Stability in South Asia,” Stimson Center, November 13, 2012, 1–2,
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/George_Perkovich_-
_The_Non_Unitary_Model_and_Deterrence_Stability_in_South_Asia.pdf.
6 “Mumbai Attacks: India Raises Security Footing to ‘War Level’,” Telegraph, November 
30, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/3536416/Mumbai-
attacks-India-raises-security-footing-to-war-level.html; also see “Mumbai Attack Might 
have Led to Ind-Pak Nuclear War: Roemer,” Indian Express, September 1, 2011, 
http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/mumbai-attack-might-have-led-to-indpak-nuclear-
war-roemer/840092/0.
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(holy war or struggle). Although most militant movements have subscribed 
to the ideas of “Islamic Jihad” and have freely used its populist narratives, 
such a one-dimensional characterization of their dynamic is too simplistic. 
Furthermore, this obscures the intricate ways in which ideational aspects of 
Islamic Jihad have intersected with geopolitical forces in the region to create 
transborder militant actors. U.S. preoccupation with the fight against al-
Qaeda’s presence in the region and the need to ensure regional support for 
the war effort in Afghanistan have dominated the international agenda. There 
was an assumption amongst U.S. policymakers that the threat to regional 
security posed by transborder militant and Islamist organizations could be a 
common cause for greater regional cooperation between Central Asian 
countries.7  
Many regional states also found it expedient to subsume all their 
domestic challenges and regional geopolitical agendas and couch them 
within meta-narratives related to the Global War on Terror. This has 
obscured the fact that states sharing these three troublesome political borders 
continue to attach great importance to unfinished conflicts related to these ill-
defined spaces. All have complex interests intertwined with these borders, 
which have shaped and continue to shape practices towards the communities 
that straddle these borders as well as inter-state relations. In other words, 
state policies and practices have shaped the nature, forms, and actions of 
transborder militant organizations, and they continue to do so in significant 
ways.
This chapter explores the mechanism through which the peculiar geo-
spatial aspects of the three conflicted border spaces intersect with 
community-level solidarity groups. This is intended to explain how the 
ability of groups to move across or transcend borders itself changes and 
transforms these groups. We examine this dynamic process of existence by 
asking how initial, more local agendas become scaled upwards, thereby 
embracing more international jihadist causes with expanding geo-spatial and 
regional links. This is followed by brief accounts of the three border spaces: 
the Ferghana Valley, the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and the Line of 
Control—the Pakistan-India border in Kashmir, which all relate to some of 
the largest transborder militant groups in the region. Finally, we conclude 
                                                          
7 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “India and Pakistan: Is Peace Real this 
Time?,” (a conversation between Husain Haqqani and Ashley Tellis), April 1, 2004, 9, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/India-Pakistan.pdf.
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that policies developed to address the issue of transborder militant actors 
must take into account two primary contexts: local conditions around border 
regions; and state practices towards their conflicted borders. The trend of
militancy within border communities is without exception linked to 
economic marginalization and chronically low development. 
Border Spaces: Points Where Jihad and Geopolitics 
Intersect  
The transformation of community-level solidarity groups into transborder 
organizations with links to regional and international jihadist causes is tied to 
the peculiar geo-spatial features of border spaces. A feature shared by all 
three border spaces, that is, the Ferghana Valley, the Pakistan-Afghanistan 
border zone, and the Line of Control in Kashmir, is that co-ethnic, 
transborder communities are present in significant numbers around these 
borders, hugging them very closely at certain points. Cycles of societal and 
political change in the region, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991 or periodic foreign interventions, have led to revolts, insurgencies and 
other forms of group mobilization in the region. The states connected with 
these areas have used coercion through their respective security apparatuses 
to deny space to opposition forces and defeat them, and have consequently 
maintained a status quo on power within their countries for the last quarter-
century. The presence of transborder, co-ethnic communities straddling some 
borders has allowed threatened groups to secure their survival in sanctuaries 
across state borders.
The majority of the populations in the South-Central Asian region are 
Muslim. Consequently groups in the region have used the Islamic concept of 
“jihad” or struggle for a cause—both armed and peaceful—throughout 
contemporary history in reaction to the consequences of nineteenth-century 
imperialism and twentieth-century interventions in the region. The Basmachi 
uprising against Bolshevik expansion in Central Asia in the 1920s and 30s,8
                                                          
8 The Basmachi Movement (or Revolt) was a national liberation movement that occurred 
from 1916 to 1934. It was carried out mostly by Turkic Muslims in Turkestan in response to 
attempts at the Sovietization of Central Asia. Enver Pasha, a former Turkish army general, 
led the movement at the height of the resistance. Pasha’s death, as well as Soviet economic 
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and Afghan mujahedin-led insurgency during the 1980s9 against the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan, are examples of early and late twentieth-century 
struggle against foreign interventions. In both cases the concept of jihad was 
invoked by a coalition of religious and local communal leaders in order to 
rally resistance against domination by foreign occupiers.10
In both cases, these movements included solidarity groups that were 
either familial, clan or tribal, or that related to a mosque or madrassah and 
had wider transborder communal links. It is only over the last fourteen years, 
due to the Global War on Terror and the presence of al-Qaeda leadership in 
South-Central Asia, that there has been a conflation of practically all 
transborder armed actors waging jihad in the region with transnational 
terrorism.11 This rapid change calls for an examination of the processes by 
which limited, national-level struggles of transborder organizations or 
solidarity groups grow to become associated with wider “jihads” being 
fought regionally. The Afghan Taliban, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
and the Kashmiri mujahedin groups, all born out of very specific and limited 
geopolitical and spatial contexts have, over the years, gone on to embrace 
other causes that encompass regional “jihads.” All three aforementioned 
organizations have at one point described their cause or struggle in the 
typical language of jihad, but all three remain bound to more localized 
geopolitical contexts which shape their goals and aspirations.
                                                                                                                            
and religious concessions, brought about the end of the uprising. See Didar Kassymova, 
Zhanat Kundakbayeva, and Ustina Markus, Historical Dictionary of Kazakhstan (Lanham: 
Scarecrow Press, 2012), 47. 
9 The Soviet-Afghan War was a conflict that lasted from 1979 to 1989 and was fought 
between the Soviet army and the government of Afghanistan on one side and the mujahedin 
rebels and their foreign supporters on the other. The battle became a proxy war in the Cold 
War between the U.S. and the USSR, in which the U.S. funneled anti-aircraft weapons to 
the rebels through the Pakistani ISI. The mujahedin rebels became an emblem of Muslim 
resistance against foreign invaders, and attracted support from across the Middle East in the 
form of money, weapons and fighters. They eventually forced a Soviet pullout, thereby 
leaving behind a power vacuum and provoking civil war. See Alam Payind, “Soviet-Afghan 
Relations from Cooperation to Occupation,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 
21, no. 1 (February 1989): 124. 
10 Kassymova, Kundakbayeva, and Markus, Historical Dictionary, 47; also see Gilles Kepel, 
Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 146.
11 Christine Fair, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India, (Santa 
Monica: RAND Corporation, 2004), 24; also see Jacob N. Shapiro and Christine Fair, 
“Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan,” International Security 34, no. 
3 (Winter 2009): 88.
84
Much has been written about the jihad infrastructure in the region, 
including the training camps and sanctuaries in the Pakistan and Afghanistan 
border areas since the 1980s.12 There are a number of accounts describing 
how these training facilities for the Afghan mujahedin brought together their 
local Pakistani supporters, Arabs, and other Muslims from around the 
world.13 By most accounts, these training camps functioned as platforms for 
the cross-pollination of ideas, exposing Afghans and Pakistanis who trained 
there to the wider struggles in the Muslim world, which over time 
contributed to the formation of international terrorist networks in the areas 
covered by Pakistan and Afghanistan. The basics of jihad that were learned 
in these training facilities may very well have provided the ideational glue to 
bind together these denominationally different religious forces, thereby 
enabling them to cooperate across the geopolitical lines that separate them. 
For example, the Afghan Taliban (who are predominantly Pashtun) have 
cooperated with a whole spectrum of ethnic-based groups, including the 
Uzbek-Tajik IMU, which has been utilized to extend Taliban control to 
northern Afghanistan.14 The Deobandi Taliban have also at times cooperated 
with the Pakistani extremist group Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT), which is Ahl-e-
Hadith, a different religious denomination, in eastern Afghanistan.15
However, the focus on “jihad infrastructure,” while it highlights the 
ideational aspects and the appeal of jihad as motivational factors for group 
actions, omits a discussion of the wider socio-political dynamics at hand. 
                                                          
12 Coll, Ghost Wars, 83–87, 134; and see Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, 
Talibanistan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 99–101; also see Rizwan 
Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan (Burlington: 
Ashgate, 2005), 121–24.
13 Coll, Ghost Wars, 83–87.
14 Michael Fredholm, “Uzbekistan and the Threat from Islamic Extremism,” Conflict Studies 
Research Centre, March 2003, 24, 
http://www.da.mod.uk/Research-Publications/category/69/uzbekistan-the-threat-from-
islamic-extremism-8801; also see Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in 
Central Asia (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 175–76; and see Jessica Stern, “The 
Protean Enemy,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 4 (July–August 2003): 2; and see Michael 
Fredholm, “Islamic Extremism as a Political Force,” Asian Cultures and Modernity 
Research Report, no. 12 (October 2006): 19, http://gpfeurope.com/upload/iblock/874/
fredholm%20islamic%20extremism%20in%20central%20asia%20rr12.pdf.
15 Stephen Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba in Perspective: An Evolving Threat,” New America 
Foundation, February 2010, 3–4, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Lashkar-e-Taiba_in_
Perspective.pdf; Alyssa Rubin, “Militant Group Expands Attacks in Afghanistan,” New 
York Times, June 15, 2010, http://www. nytimes.com/2010/06/16/ world/asia/16lashkar.
html.
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One aspect of militancy in the region evident in all three cases which has 
received far less attention is that the spatial relocation of each organization 
within the region has also induced the relocation of varying numbers of 
dependents. This has been sufficiently documented over the years: in the case 
of the Afghan Taliban, literally millions of their co-ethnic communities still 
live in Pakistan and, over the years, have become part of the political 
economy of Pakistan’s border spaces. The IMU’s transborder migrations 
from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan to Afghanistan, and then to Pakistan, have 
been accompanied by the migration of family members from Andijon, 
Namangan and other border regions in the Ferghana Valley.16 Although there 
is less evidence for the migration of families of Kashmiri fighters from 
Indian-controlled Kashmir, in recent years the patronage of the Indian 
Kashmiri diaspora by the Pakistani state already in early decades has had a 
profound impact on the agendas of Pakistan-based Kashmiri militant 
groups.17 In short, transborder movements of Islamic militants in search of 
sanctuaries in South-Central Asia are accompanied by the migration of 
extended families, clans and in some cases entire communities. All states of 
origin, as well as host states, have used violence, retribution, torture and 
detention of family members of militants as a punishment for anti-state 
activities. In times of civil war, armed non-state actors and factions have also 
used ethnic violence against wider communities related to opposing 
solidarity groups. The Afghan Civil War in the 1990s is a good example of 
such communal violence.18
These migrations across geopolitical lines in themselves constitute an 
important next step in a group’s transformation. Transborder militants and 
their community members are immediately confronted with the need to 
negotiate space and sanctuary. This negotiation for space by transborder 
groups takes place both at the level of local power elites, as well as with the 
agents of the host states, who are often members of intelligence and border 
                                                          
16 Fredholm, “Islamic Extremism,” 28; and see Noah Tucker, “Uzbek Extremism in Context, 
Part 1: The Uzbek Jihad and the Problem of Religious Freedom,” Registan, September 12, 
2012, http://registan.net/2013/09/12/uzbek-extremism-in-context-part-1-the-uzbek-jihad-
and-the-problem-of-religious-freedom/.
17 Marta Bolognani and Stephen M. Lyon, Pakistan and its Diaspora: Multidisciplinary 
Approaches (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 100–2. 
18 Chris Johnson and Jolyon Leslie, Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace (New York: Zed 
Books, 2004), 47–60.
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security agencies.19 In short, all sanctuaries come with strings attached; for a 
transborder group which finds itself in a new environment, becoming 
involved in and giving support to new local struggles or “jihads” may almost 
immediately become a means of survival. Their ideational co-optation into 
wider (regional or global) meanings of jihad probably follow later and take 
place through the common experience of formal training camps.
All the states in the region which share the three complex border areas—
Kashmir, Ferghana, and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border—play a very 
significant role in shaping the agendas of these groups. This is primarily 
achieved through administrative policies and the use of state security 
apparatuses. State practices of coercion and the use of force against local 
opposition are not only responsible for denying space to these groups in their 
home bases but also for shaping how these transborder actors adjust within 
their new environments. The Uzbek government’s brutal attempts to stifle all 
opposition changed the contours of the IMU by pushing group leaders into 
exile in Tajikistan. Participation in the Tajik Civil War broadened the IMU’s
agenda and regional network of contacts. The use of overwhelming force by 
the Indian military in Kashmir in the 1990s swelled the ranks of Kashmiri 
militants who found sanctuaries, training camps, and also financial support 
provided by the Pakistani state on the other side of the disputed border.20
Lingering inter-state disputes have distorted states’ relations with border 
communities in these border areas, which often are referred to as being 
“ungoverned.”21 However, although these areas are predominantly rural and 
underdeveloped, and the state’s capacity to provide goods and services there 
is limited, they are not beyond the reach of the state’s security apparatus. 
Once on the other side, migrating groups are confronted with the 
                                                          
19 Fredholm, “Islamic Extremism,” 20–21, 25–27.
20 Stephen Phillip Cohen, “India, Pakistan and Kashmir,” Journal of Strategic Studies 25, no. 
4 (December, 2002): 47–48; also see Haley Duschinski, “Destiny Effects: Militarization, 
State Power, and Punitive Containment in Kashmir Valley,” Anthropological Quarterly 82, 
no. 3 (Summer 2009): 697.
21 Ahmad Raza Rumi, “Pakistan: Ungoverned Spaces,” Centro de Documentación 
Internacional de Barcelona, July 2012, 2,
http://razarumi.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Pakistan-Ungoverned-Spaces.pdf; and see 
David Danelo, “Anarchy is the New Normal: Unconventional Governance and 21st Century 
Statecraft,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, October 14, 2013, http://www.fpri.
org/docs/Danelo_-_Anarchy_the_New_Normal.pdf; also see Phil Williams, “Here Be 
Dragons: Dangerous Spaces and International Security,” in Ungoverned Spaces: 
Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty, ed. Anne L. Clunan and 
Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 39–40.
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omnipresent, coercive security apparatus of the new host state. States with 
unresolved territorial conflicts with their neighbors view such local 
communities as the first line of defense against the revisionist or hostile 
designs of these neighbors and, consequently, they have developed complex 
political and security practices to control these border communities. 
India has increasingly militarized the zone along the Line of Control in 
Kashmir and has recently hardened the border even further by fencing large 
sections of it. Its relations with the Muslim Kashmiri communities that live 
along the border are marked by suspicion.22 The Indian-controlled Kashmir 
Valley remains excessively militarized, with over half a million Indian 
military forces deployed in a very narrow part of the territory. There is heavy 
penetration of state intelligence agencies within community groups, and the 
security force’s special powers for detention have led to gross violations of 
human rights.23 The Uzbekistani state has instituted arbitrary border control 
practices and put in place a complex web of checkpoints in order to control 
social and economic activity in the Ferghana Valley.24 Its worsening 
relations, in particular with Tajikistan, are reflected in the coercive practices 
of border guards at checkpoints against significant Tajik minorities, who 
thereby become victims of extortion. 
                                                          
22 Duschinski, “Destiny Effects,” 700; and see Cohen, “India, Pakistan and Kashmir,” 48; also 
see Sameer Yasir, “Fear Stalks Villages on Kashmir Border,” International New York 
Times, August 9, 2013, http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/09/fear-stalks-villages-on-
kashmir-border/?_r=0.
23 Nick Allen, “Wikileaks: India ‘Systematically Torturing Civilians in Kashmir,’”
Telegraph, December 17, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/
8208084/WikiLeaks-India-systematically-torturing-civilians-in-Kashmir.html; and see U.S. 
Department of State, “2010 Human Rights Report: India,” April 8, 2011, 1, http://www.
state.gov/documents/organization/160058.pdf; also see Caitlin Huey-Burns, “Amnesty
International Cites Human Rights Abuses in Kashmir,” US News and World Report, March 
28, 2011, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2011/03/28/amnesty-international-cites-
human-rights-abuse-in-kashmir. 
24 International Crisis Group, “Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential,” Asia 
Report, no. 33 (April 4, 2002), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/central-
asia/Central%20Asia%20Border%20Disputes%20and%20Conflict%20Potential.pdf; also 
see Nick Megoran, “Borders of External Friendship? The Politics of Pain of Nationalism 
and Identity along the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley Boundary 1999–2000,” 
(Unpublished thesis, Cambridge: Sydney Sussex College, 2002), 46–50, https://www.staff.
ncl.ac.uk/nick.megoran/pdf/nick_megoran_phd.pdf; also see Morgan Y. Liu, Recognizing 
the Khan: authority, space, and political imagination among Uzbek men in post-Soviet Osh, 
Kyrgyzstan (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2002), 164.
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The most complex case here is Pakistan’s relations with its tribal 
population on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.25 The rise of a left-leaning 
Pashtun nationalist movement in the 1970s rekindled the Pakistani state’s 
insecurities related to the old dispute over its border with Afghanistan. 
Pakistan inherited the Durand line, or the British-era border between India 
and Afghanistan, after its independence in 1947.26 The refusal of subsequent 
Afghan governments to recognize the border, and claims on Pakistan’s 
frontier regions by various Afghan leaders, have shaped the state’s relations 
and practices with its border communities. Over the years it has cultivated 
local tribal elites through patrimonial practices enshrined in the British-era 
FCR (Frontier Crimes Regulations), with its archaic system of rewards and 
collective punishment.27 The FCR guaranteed tribes a certain level of 
autonomy and patronage in exchange for their allegiance to the state and its 
interests. This allowed the Pakistani state to control tribal territories in border 
areas without deploying its regular military forces. 
The 30-year cycle of war in Afghanistan and changes in the political 
economy of the tribal areas has led to the breakdown of societal structures 
and the system of the traditional tribal elite. The Pakistani state has 
responded by undertaking a complex set of practices, which seek to 
reconstitute its old patrimonial relations with the tribes around the new 
militant factions that have emerged as modern power elites.28 Through neo-
patrimonial relations built around an informal system of rewards and use of 
force, the Pakistani state continues to shape the politics of these militant 
factions in line with its own geopolitical and security interests. 
The deployment of Pakistani military forces in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) since 2004 has had a destabilizing 
impact on Pakistan’s tribal belt. It has brought the state into direct 
confrontation with some militant tribal factions, while also increasing its 
                                                          
25 Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of 
Bangladesh (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), 222. 
26 Jayshree Bajoria, “The Troubled Afghan-Pakistani Border,” Council on Foreign Relations 
Backgrounder, March 20, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/troubled-afghan-pakistani-
border/p14905.
27 Amir Mohammad Khan, “Justice Denied,” Newsline, December 6, 2004, http://www.news 
linemagazine.com/2004/12/justice-denied/; also see S. M. M. Qureshi, “Pashtunistan:
The Frontier Dispute Between Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Pacific Affairs 39, no.1/2
(Spring–Summer 1966): 99.
28 Hussain, Pakistan, 137–41, 161–63, 183–84, 225; also see Fair, The Counterterror 
Coalitions, 19–25.
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coercive power on the ground. Within this tight security environment, 
transborder migrant groups have few choices: they can either try to frame 
their goals and actions in line with pro-state local factions and assist them 
with their “jihads” in return for sanctuary, or they become allies of local 
militants who have taken up arms against the Pakistani state and military. 
The IMU, due to changing hostile state practices and local alliances, have 
taken the latter approach.29 Afghan Taliban factions, such as the Haqqani 
network, have taken the former approach.30 The Haqqani and other eastern 
Taliban groups have echoed the Pakistani state’s regional policy preferences 
in acting against Indian presence in Afghanistan. Under the same principle, 
Afghan Taliban have allegedly assured the Chinese government that they 
will not allow the establishment of an Uighur sanctuary for dissident 
members of the East Turkistan Independence Movement (ETIM) or other 
separatists in Taliban-controlled areas.31
In short, conflicted and disputed border spaces in South-Central Asia 
have recreated geopolitical faultlines that have played a complex role as 
drivers of conflict in the region. These border spaces form the physical 
terrain along which much of the operational activity of transborder militant 
movements has taken place. Within this physical terrain, militant 
organizations demonstrate a remarkable ability to operate on various 
geopolitical fronts simultaneously. In addition, they have shown the capacity 
to shift their focus from one geopolitical hotspot to another, closely 
following the regional flashpoint of the moment. In turn, states in the region 
have sought to mitigate threats to their security and to maximize control over 
their border spaces. In doing so, they have responded to this challenge by 
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adopting a complex set of practices. We now examine more closely the three 
different conflictual border spaces and transborder militant networks which 
operate around them.
Nested in Ferghana: The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
The above-described process through which transborder actors transform 
into regionally networked groups is clearly visible in the development of the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The IMU evolved from a small-scale, local 
vigilante-style “Adolat” (justice) movement in Namangan, a city in the 
Ferghana Valley.32 The group emerged against the backdrop of the chaos that 
marked the early years of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a period of 
extreme uncertainty and upheaval.33
In 1992, when the “Adolat” movement emerged onto the scene, it was 
one of several new political platforms formed by diverse groups to challenge 
the old guard of the incumbent communist party. Empirical accounts suggest 
that it was not the primary challenge facing Islam Karimov’s regime as it 
grappled with post-independence chaos in Uzbekistan. It was the Tashkent-
centered Birlik party (led by Abdurahim Pulatov) and its splinter group Erk 
(led by Muhammad Salih) which contested the first presidential elections 
against Islam Karimov.34 At the time both Birlik and Erk had a significant 
following amongst the urban elite as well as intellectuals and students, and 
were a cause of greater concern for Islam Karimov and other ex-communist 
elites. By 1993, all three parties (including Adolat) had been banned, their 
members detained, and their leadership forced into exile.35
Escaping the Uzbek state’s crackdown, Tahir Yuldashev, leader of 
Adolat, and his deputy, Juma Boi Namangani, both sought refuge in 
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Tajikistan.36 Whereas over the years the Uzbekistani state’s extreme and 
repressive practices against all political dissent—both Islamic and secular—
led to the disintegration of the more urban-based Birlik and Erk, the geo-
spatial relocation of Adolat helped the movement to survive and to sustain 
and transform its agenda. The transborder migration of the Adolat leaders 
with their small group of followers into Tajikistan was the first step towards 
the evolution of what later became the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.37
The scaling up of the IMU’s jihad agenda followed each stage in the spatial 
migration of the group; from invoking Islamic practices and social ideas to 
promising a remedy for the chaos in Ferghana, displacement to Tajikistan 
immediately led to a widening of its jihad agenda. Adolat leaders were quick 
in siding with Tajik Islamists against the ex-communists in Tajikistan’s civil 
war.38
Repressive use of force and coercion by the Uzbekistani state also meant 
that Adolat members moved together with their families, if possible, or their 
families followed soon after.39 Family members who were left behind faced 
detention, arrest and torture. Some reports suggest that three of Yuldashev’s 
brothers were arrested and spent time in Uzbek jails, which are notorious for 
human rights violations, including torture. According to some sources, when 
Namangani arrived in Kurgan-Tyube (presently known as Qurghonteppa), 
Tajikistan in 1992, his entourage included only thirty Uzbeks and some 
Arabs who had served as emissaries to Adolat from Saudi Islamic charities 
(Saudi Arabia contained a large Uzbek diaspora, whose ancestors had fled 
during the 1918–1928 Basmachi Revolt).40
Subsequent migrations across multiple borders not only expanded the 
IMU’s political agenda but also transformed the group as it negotiated space 
in new environments and faced new political and economic realities. In 
Tajikistan, Namangani started out with a small group of close members and 
went on to form a substantial personal military force composed mostly of 
Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Chechens, but also of Arabs. Many of the men were 
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accompanied by their families, and survival of the group in rural Tajikistan in 
the midst of a civil war necessitated finding new ways of adjusting to the 
political economy of the area.41 Namangani and his group soon involved 
themselves in the drug trade;42 and he appeared to have become heavily 
involved in the transportation of heroin from Afghanistan to Tajikistan and 
onwards to Russia and Europe, at times travelling to Afghanistan himself.43
Reports suggest that despite the deaths of Namangani and Yuldashev long 
before, the IMU cadre remain an important link in trafficking routes for 
narcotics connecting northern Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and the enclaves in 
the Ferghana Valley. 
More importantly, Yuldashev’s move to Afghanistan together with the 
leaders of Tajikistan’s Islamic opposition who refused to lay down their arms 
as required by the Russia-brokered peace settlement in the Tajik Civil War 
enabled him to launch a wider political and financial campaign to raise funds 
for the group.44 Joining the Tajik opposition leaders in exile in Afghanistan 
further expanded the Uzbek group’s network of alliances and consequently 
led to the broadening of their political agenda. Yuldashev’s campaign to raise 
finances for the expanding group brought him into contact with Afghan 
Arabs and other radical groups, as well as their financiers in the foreign 
security agencies present in the region immediately after the Soviet war in 
Afghanistan ended in 1989.45 According to various sources, Yuldashev 
travelled to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and later to Iran, the United Arab 
Emirates, Turkey, and perhaps the Caucasus as well, in order to make 
contacts with Uzbek diaspora members in these countries.46 His travels seem 
to have expanded his links to the intelligence services in these countries and 
possibly allowed him to access their covert funds. His relationship with 
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) is of particular interest 
here. According to some sources, he was based in Peshawar, Pakistan from 
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1995 to 1998, where he operated out of the Center of the Afghan Arabs.47
Many of the same Arabs went on to form the core of al-Qaeda at the end of 
the 1990s. Yuldashev also received funds from various Islamic charities and, 
according to Russian and Uzbekistani officials, from the intelligence services 
of Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey. The IMU’s relationship with the Pakistani 
state security services was to change significantly in later years due to 
developments related to the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and against al-
Qaeda. 
The changing nature of wars and geopolitical conflicts in the region has 
had a profound impact on the IMU’s goals and structure, and increased its 
incentives to wage “jihad.” A major triggering event was the end of the civil 
war in Tajikistan in 1997, which threatened the sanctuary and operational 
space of Uzbek militants and their dependents in this country. When the 
majority of Islamic groups, organized under the umbrella of the United Tajik 
Opposition (UTO), signed the peace deal with ex-communists to share 
power, Namangani and his followers became isolated.48 By this time, the 
group had come to include Uzbeks, Tajiks, Chechens, and Uighurs based 
primarily in the valleys of the Rasht region in central Tajikistan. It is at this 
point in time that Yuldashev, along with Namangani, decided to re-launch 
the group as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan with its stated goal—as 
posted on the internet in August 1999—as the “establishment of an Islamic 
state with the application of the Sharia” in Uzbekistan.49 Thus, almost six 
years after the small Adolat group moved out of Namangan, the IMU 
emerged as its new hybrid face with a broader regional profile and agenda.  
The emergence of the IMU coincided with Namangani and Yuldashev’s 
relocation to Afghanistan. As the group was no longer welcome in post-civil 
war Tajikistan, the Afghan Taliban agreed to provide them with a sanctuary 
and a base.50 With their goals still focused on Uzbekistan, the IMU launched 
armed incursions into Uzbekistan from the Batken exclave in the Kyrgyz part 
of the Ferghana in 1999.51 Over the course of a year they continued to make 
forays into the Ferghana Valley by using routes out of Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, attacking Uzbek border guards and taking some Japanese and 
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American hostages.52 By 2001 the IMU incursions started to abate without 
any lasting impact on the Uzbekistani state’s control in the Ferghana Valley. 
On the contrary, the IMU incursions were used by the Uzbek state to enhance 
its security presence in the conflicted border zones.53 These incursions also
allowed Islam Karimov’s government to increase Uzbek engagement with 
the U.S. and other Western states, which were by now becoming increasingly 
focused on the global threat of terrorism.54
When the U.S. military attacks against the Taliban-led government in 
Afghanistan began in autumn 2001, the IMU fought on the Northern Front in 
Kunduz under the al-Qaeda-led 555 Brigade, which was commanded by 
Juma Namangani.55 After the fall of the Taliban in November members of 
the IMU found refuge in the South Waziristan Agency, the territory of the 
Masood tribe in the Pakistani FATA.56 Up to this point, the rhetoric on the 
website of the IMU still remained focused on Central Asian governments. 
Some messages appeared to be more in line with the objectives of other 
Afghanistan and Pakistan-based groups with which the IMU was coming into 
contact. It is important to note that Yuldashev’s and the IMU’s online 
messages started to directly attack the U.S. only after the group moved into 
Pakistani tribal regions in the FATA.57
In 2002, the IMU split into the IJU (Islamic Jihad Union), a group that 
has acted as al-Qaeda’s recruitment and outreach wing to Europeans of 
Turkish descent.58 Western European Muslims have also been trained by the 
IMU in camps in North Waziristan, Pakistan. German nationals of Turkish 
and Moroccan descent have been identified based on their threat messages 
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against Germany. In September 2009, Pakistani investigators discovered a 
“village” of mainly German insurgents, including Muslim converts from this 
country but also a number from Sweden, who were being trained in a camp 
controlled by the IMU in the Waziristan area of Pakistan.59
In 2007, under pressure from the U.S. and other Western partners, 
Pakistan’s military launched an operation, with support from tribal forces 
under Maulvi Nazir, to evict the IMU from North Waziristan.60 The Pakistani 
state’s changing approaches and security perceptions regarding its own 
border spaces have had a profound impact on the changes that the IMU as an 
organization has undergone. IMU’s original leaders, Yuldashev and 
Namangani, both had very clear goals, one of which was establishing an 
Islamic caliphate in the Ferghana Valley. After its move into Pakistan’s tribal 
belt, much of the group’s energy became focused on surviving in an 
increasingly hostile environment, as the Pakistani state’s perceptions of the 
IMU changed. Yuldashev had to postpone his agenda of jihad in Central Asia 
as he and the IMU became more involved with local militant dynamics in 
FATA, including the Pakistani state’s complex relations with some of these 
local militant groups. The IMU became closely associated with Baitullah 
Masood, the leader of the Masood tribal militants and IMU’s main host in 
FATA.61 As the leader of a group of militants based in South Waziristan, 
Baitullah Masood became increasingly hostile towards the Pakistani military. 
In 2007, he launched the umbrella militant organization Tehrik-e-Taliban 
(TTP), which has waged a war against the Pakistani state and military. The 
IMU has become increasingly linked with the TTP.62
In short, the IMU’s geo-spatial journey has not only influenced its 
agenda and scaled up its goals, but it has also changed the very nature of the 
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organization itself. After the death of Namangani in 2001 and Yuldashev in
2009, the IMU seems to have lost its original focus on Central Asia. The list 
of martyrs posted on its websites by the organization includes ever fewer 
names of fighters of Central Asian origin.63 The IMU of today appears to be 
made up mostly of members from northern Afghanistan and to be working in 
partnership with other local militant groups. Finally, the IMU’s lack of clear 
end-goals makes it difficult to distinguish it from other militant groups 
operating in Afghanistan or Pakistan, particularly when the remnants of the 
IMU rely on local forces to stay operational. Within their southern zone of 
operation around the border spaces between Afghanistan and Pakistan, they 
operate closely with groups allied with the Pakistani Taliban, which are 
fighting the Pakistani military forces in FATA.64 Intelligence reports suggest 
that the IMU cadre has also served as a bridgehead for the Taliban in helping 
them to expand influence in the northern zone of operation around the 
Afghanistan-Tajikistan border and in the Afghan border provinces of 
Kunduz and Baghlan.65
The Troubled Border Between Afghanistan and Pakistan 
The role played by Pakistani state policies, including those of its intelligence 
agencies, in shaping tribal transborder forces, such as the Afghan Mujahedin 
in the 1980s and Taliban in the 1990s, is well known and documented. What 
is less understood is how the thirty-year cycle of war and conflict within the 
border spaces between Afghanistan and Pakistan has accelerated the process 
of change within these areas and how it, in turn, has impacted state practices. 
The political geography of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border shares some 
of the features of the borders in the Ferghana Valley described earlier. A 
colonial-era relic, the 2,600-km-long Durand Line is badly defined and in 
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places practically nonexistent.66 It is also largely unregulated and inhabited 
by transborder Pashtun tribal groups. The British Envoy, Sir Mortimer 
Durand, and the Amir of Afghanistan, Abdur Rahman Khan, agreed to this 
boundary in November 1893, but no Afghan government has ever officially 
recognized it as an international boundary.67 Afghanistan was the only state 
in 1947 that opposed the admission of Pakistan into the United Nations after 
its independence from India.68 The conflicted history of the border has had a 
complex impact on inter-state relations between the two countries. 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the ensuing war in the 1980s 
critically transformed the demographic, societal, political and economic 
structures within the tribal regions of Pakistan. An important legacy of the 
war in the 1980s in Pakistan is the continued presence of more than 70 
Afghan refugee camps and settlements scattered along Pakistan’s western 
border. There are still 1.5 million registered Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and 
Pakistan’s internally displaced (IDPs) add a further 1.4 million (half of them 
caused by the ongoing security operations) to the people living in the camps 
maintained by the UNHCR.69 The enduring refugee populations have had a 
complex impact on transborder militant networks and solidarity groups built 
around the camps, schools, and madrassahs attended by both Afghan 
refugees and local tribesmen. An example is the Shamshatoo Refugee Camp 
run for the last thirty years by the mujahedin leader Gulbadin Hikmatyar’s 
group Hizb Islami.70 It is still a recruiting ground for the Hizb today.71 Over 
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the past three decades, the camp has become a small city of more than 64,000 
inhabitants, with mosques, madrassahs, high schools, a university, a hospital, 
and even two local newspapers.72 These camps have played a profound role 
in the recruitment strategies of militant organizations and the ability of 
groups like the Afghan Taliban to regenerate. 
While the Afghan Taliban operate in Afghanistan, for the past three 
decades they have also become embedded within the social, political, and 
economic landscape of Pakistan’s border zones. This includes Baluchistan 
province, parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (KPK, formerly known as the Northwest Frontier Province), 
and key cities in the Pakistani heartland (e.g. Karachi, Peshawar, Quetta). 
The Afghan Taliban emerged from Deobandi Madaris (madrassahs) in 
Pakistan.73 They have retained their nearly exclusive ethnic Pashtun and 
Deobandi sectarian orientation, which they share with a large number of 
Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen, many of whom have also studied in the same 
seminaries and madrassahs.74 These multiple solidarity networks born out of 
the common experiences of war, conflict, and migration have resulted in a 
closely-knit network of contacts that have deepened connectivity between 
border communities from both countries. 
The transborder movement of men and materials has become more 
varied and complex today than it was before the U.S.-led war. On the 
Pakistan-Afghanistan border, large refugee movements have now given way 
to labor migrations, along with continued social and cultural exchanges 
between the country of origin and the country of exile. This is facilitated by 
the presence of well-established transborder social networks on both sides. 
According to the UNHCR, approximately 80,000 to 100,000 Afghans cross 
the border daily into Pakistan from the two border crossings at Torkham and 
Spin Boldak for work as day laborers or for family visits.75 The vast majority 
(almost 75 percent) of them are young, single, working-age males.76 Most of 
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the transient labor migrants are from southern and eastern Afghanistan. 
These regions still remain Afghan Taliban strongholds and the Taliban’s 
main support bases in Afghanistan. 
These networked interests between the Afghan Taliban and their 
Pakistani tribal affiliates have had a complex impact on the Pakistani state’s 
security practices related to transborder militant groups. Forced into the tribal 
areas in support of the U.S. war in 2004, the Pakistani military has acted 
selectively and targeted only those groups with a narrower transborder 
support base. The IMU, with their Central Asian roots and their local hosts, 
the Masood tribal militants from South Waziristan, became the main 
targets.77 Most military operations avoided taking on the Afghan Taliban and 
their close networks among Pakistani tribal militants.78
This selective targeting of transborder groups has led to a complex 
reconfiguration of the militant landscape within the border regions. For the 
IMU sanctuaries within Pakistani border regions have shrunk, especially 
since the Pakistani military’s large-scale South Waziristan operation in 2009, 
and Operation Zarb-e-Azb launched more recently in June 2014 in North 
Waziristan Agency.79 Consequently, most of the IMU fighters and their 
dependents have relocated to northern Afghan provinces bordering 
Tajikistan.80 Some obdurate Central Asian fighters affiliated with IMU and 
IJU still remain in FATA and have joined al-Qaeda remnants and their other 
Pakistani affiliates in fighting the Pakistani military.81
On the other hand, the targeting of local Pakistani militants by the 
Pakistani military has led to the rise of another militant organization: Tehrik-
e-Taliban Pakistan. The TTP operates as an umbrella group for organizations 
that endorse al-Qaeda’s Takfiri82 ideology and consider the Pakistani state, 
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its citizens, and its cities legitimate targets because of their perceived 
complicity with the U.S. and the coalition forces in Afghanistan. Some 
Pakistani militant groups affiliated with the TTP from the Bajaur Agency in 
FATA and from the district of Swat have found sanctuary in the Kunar 
province in eastern Afghanistan.83 From these sanctuaries, militant groups 
launched several armed cross-border incursions into Pakistani territory in 
2011–2012,84 to which Pakistani military has since responded with the 
shelling of border villages on the Afghan side.85 This has added another 
dimension to the already tense inter-state relations between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. 
Presently, more than 150,000 Pakistani military troops remain deployed 
along the border,86 engaged in several small and large military operations 
against an assortment of militant groups. The selective use of force by the 
Pakistan military against some militant factions has had a transformative 
impact on militant group structures and agendas. It has pushed the TTP and 
IMU remnants in FATA closer to al-Qaeda’s more internationalist jihad 
ideology. Since 2008, the U.S. has expanded the use of drone strikes to target 
al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban and their affiliates such as the Haqqani 
Network and their Pakistani networks in the tribal belt.87 These strikes have 
inflamed local resentment and have been successfully exploited by anti-
Pakistani state militants such as TTP and al-Qaeda in order to increase 
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recruitment.88 The TTP, along with remnants of al-Qaeda, has retaliated to 
drone strikes and Pakistani military operations by launching terrorist strikes 
against soft targets in all major Pakistani cities and military installations.89
The Disputed Kashmir Border Between India and Pakistan 
The history of the disputed Kashmir border has defined inter-state relations 
between the two South Asian neighbors, Pakistan and India, for the past sixty 
years. This high altitude border in the Himalayan foothills has several 
features in common with the two other disputed borders described earlier. 
Transborder communities comprised of ethnic Kashmiris tightly straddle the 
740-km-long border at certain points.90 After the partition of the Indian 
subcontinent in 1947, a dispute over the state of Jammu and Kashmir started 
in 1948–1949.91 The military control line or the cease-fire line between the 
Indian and the Pakistani parts of the former princely state of Jammu and 
Kashmir became the de facto border. The Line of Control (LoC), to this day, 
does not constitute a legally recognized international boundary. Running 
through the heart of villages and communities, it divides families and clans 
and disrupts all normal societal interactions such as commerce and trade in 
these areas.
The presence of Kashmiri militant groups and their training camps 
within Pakistani-controlled parts of Kashmir has been a cause of inter-state 
tensions and war. The link between the Kashmir dispute and the Pashtun 
tribes from FATA dates back to 1948, when Pakistan used irregular forces 
and tribal militias from this area to infiltrate the state of Kashmir and prevent 
its accession to India.92 This practice of state support for non-state actors as a 
tool of foreign policy by employing the principle of “plausible deniability” is 
not confined solely to Pakistan. For example, India used the same practice 
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when it supported and armed transborder insurgent groups in East Pakistan in 
the 1970s, successfully helping Bangladesh to secede from Pakistan.93
The lingering disputes between India and Pakistan, and especially over 
Kashmir, have impacted how both states treat their border communities and 
transborder militants. The Indian state has had a zero-tolerance policy in 
regard to Kashmir-centered militant groups and has responded with brutal 
force to all political mobilization and dissent by Kashmiris. Since the 1990s, 
it has deployed a growing number of military forces to quell a populist 
uprising in the Kashmir Valley.94 Starting in the 1990s and ending in 2004, 
India proceeded to install landmines and an electrified double fence along 
550 kilometers of the LoC. In addition, it has deployed around 700,000 
military and paramilitary forces within the narrow valley and along the 
border spaces, thereby making the LoC one of the hardest, most excessively 
militarized borders in the world.95 A large number of Kashmiri militants have 
been forced to relocate to the Pakistani part of Kashmir so as to escape being 
killed or captured. This has allowed them to continue their armed struggle 
from the other side.96 On the other side of the border, the Pakistani state has 
provided varying levels of support to Kashmiri militants, including training 
camps and financial support for militants and their dependents.97
Over the last two decades, the old conflict over the Kashmir border has 
become intertwined with the ebb and flow of war on the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border. The links built between certain Kashmiri and Punjabi 
fighters from Pakistan with the Afghan mujahedin during the Soviet war in 
the 1980s have persisted and gone through various complex transformations. 
Most of these transformations have followed larger trends in the inter-state 
relations between India and Pakistan and other flashpoints within the broader 
region. 
Several militant groups operating across the LoC proclaim Kashmir to be 
their sole focus. These include the Jamaat-e-Islami-based Hizb-ul-
Mujahedin, or HuM, and Al Badr, which tend to be comprised of ethnic 
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Kashmiris and have retained their focus on Kashmir.98 However, there are a 
number of other groups with different religious denominations that have 
expanded their jihad agenda since the latest phase of the U.S.-led war in 
Afghanistan. These include Deobandi groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammad 
(JM), Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami (HuJI), and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), as well as 
the Ahl-e-Hadith group, Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT), which in the last ten years 
has moved away from an exclusive focus on Kashmir.99 Various intelligence 
sources suggest that, since at least 2005, LeT has increased its focus on the 
Pakistan-Afghanistan border and currently operates in some areas in eastern 
Afghanistan, albeit on a limited scale.100
One reason for this shift in focus was the 2003 ceasefire agreement 
between India and Pakistan over the LoC.101 According to the agreement, 
Pakistan would act to reduce militant incursions from the LoC into the 
Indian-held Kashmir Valley. A number of Pakistani and Kashmiri militants 
saw this as an act of appeasement by General Musharaff to the Indians and 
the U.S., and this led to the splintering of some of these groups.102 Several of 
the splinter groups from Jaish, HuJI, and LeJ became more closely allied 
with al-Qaeda, which was being chased out of Pakistan by the U.S.-Pakistan 
counterterror operations. Currently, most of the splinter groups have joined
the increasingly active TTP in order to open dual fronts against NATO-led 
troops in Afghanistan and against Pakistani state targets and its military in 
FATA.103 Some Indian and U.S. analysts are currently projecting that the 
withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO from Afghanistan will encourage some of 
the Kashmir-centered groups such as LeT and HuJI to return full circle to 
their focus on the Kashmir front, thereby escalating tensions between India 
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and Pakistan. Since 2012, an increase in incidents of cross-border firing and 
attacks along the LoC give some credence to such analysis.104
Conclusion
As the U.S.-led War against Terror and the Taliban in Afghanistan nears its 
end, al-Qaeda has responded with its own geopolitical strategy. Since 2010, a 
clear pattern has emerged whereby al-Qaeda operatives and their affiliates 
have tried to embed themselves and find a role in conflicts that are local in 
nature. Long-running local political disputes within the poorly governed 
border spaces of weak states such as Afghanistan and Pakistan (other 
examples include Yemen and Somalia) are providing opportunities for al-
Qaeda and other groups to resurrect their weakening structures and operate 
through local partnerships.105 There are certain similarities in the broad 
dynamics of how these organizations operate in these very diverse arenas. By 
aligning themselves with local political actors who are challenging weak 
states, they are able to find sanctuaries and space for the radicalization of 
local militants or insurgents into cells with transnational ambitions and goals. 
Crucially, al-Qaeda is finding space in these conflicts less as foot soldiers 
and more as “tech savvy” specialists bringing in specialized knowledge of 
new communication, explosives, and weapons technologies. The growing 
reliance on counterterrorism strategies by the U.S. is made evident by the 
sharp increase in the number of drone strikes from 2008 to 2012.106 These 
strikes have inflamed popular resentment in Pakistan as well as in Yemen 
over issues of sovereignty, legality and human costs, and ultimately resulted 
in increased support for the militant groups.
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Clearly, there are limits to what force-based strategies can achieve in 
containing the challenge of transborder militancy. In fact, the immoderate use 
of force by states in border zones has led to the metastasizing of militancy 
and extremism in South-Central Asia. As international engagement with the 
region is set to change with the U.S. and NATO military withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, it is imperative that the policies and practices of international 
actors and regional stakeholders take heed of the complex linkages between 
state policies, the geo-spatial features of borders, and transborder militants. 
There is a need for a fresh look at the problem and further exploration of 
ways in which conventional use of force may be coupled with other 
approaches to target root causes. 
The two things that directly impact the presence of transborder actors are 
the local conditions that pertain in border regions, and state practices towards 
their conflicted borders. Only through a consistent recalibration of these two 
problem areas does it become possible to achieve long-term mitigation of the 
threat posed by militant actors. Economic marginalization and low 
development trends within border communities help sustain dynamics of 
militant transborder movements. There are no alternatives to painstaking but 
steady development within conflicted and marginalized spaces around border 
regions in order to sufficiently transform local conditions which breed and 
sustain transborder militant movements. 
State practices towards militant actors in the region are linked in 
complex ways to enduring inter-state geopolitical issues. These intractable 
conflicts over territory, borders and resource issues have to be revisited 
whilst designing future responses. There are practical policy implications that 
emerge from this evaluation. The possible waning of the Global War on 
Terror does not mean that the challenges faced by regional states from these 
movements will dissipate. The presence of transborder actors will continue to 
pose complex problems for states in South and Central Asia that already 
suffer from varying degrees of governance and state capacity issues. For the 
regional states, however, the loosening of the “Global War on Terror” 
framework has meant greater possibilities of differentiation between groups. 
Increasingly, as trends suggest, the politics of militant groups and terrorism 
are likely to become a focus of national policies and practices. States in the 
region are making distinctions between groups who are using terrorism as a 
tactical tool for political ends and those who have more globalist and diffuse 
jihad agendas. Just as the U.S. and its allies are differentiating between Al 
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Nusra107 and other radical groups fighting against the Assad regime in Syria, 
stakeholders in Afghanistan are beginning to differentiate the Afghan 
Taliban from al-Qaeda. Similarly, Pakistan continues to respond to the 
Afghan Taliban, the TTP, and Kashmiri militant groups focused on Kashmir 
differently from the Kashmiri groups aligned with al-Qaeda and attack the 
Pakistani state and its security forces. 
Indeed, drawing distinctions between groups is a key to policies that can 
untie the linkages weaving together conflicts and confrontations in border 
spaces. Such policies are becoming all the more pertinent as also the Islamic 
State, which has developed in Syria and in Iraq, is gaining influence in the 
region. Regrettably, the present international emphasis on greater regional 
cooperation as a means to build security in the post-withdrawal situation in 
and around Afghanistan has largely stalled over the issue of transborder 
organization and its linkage to militant activity and jihadist causes. As a 
consequence, this extremely complex problem area is being left to mainly 
national policies.
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